In other words, we assumed that [B] is a deduction from (T, [A] ) in K if, and only if, whenever [A] 3 is a hypothetical deduction from T in K, [B] is a deduction from T in K.
We then argued, that it should follow (essentially by the reasoning in §2.2 below), that:
[(Ax)R(x) => ~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, and, therefore, that:
[~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable.
We then concluded that PA is omega-inconsistent.
However, this conclusion is inconsistent with standard interpretations of Gödel's reasoning, which, firstly, assert both [(Ax)R(x)] and [~(Ax)R(x)] as PA-unprovable, and, secondly, assume that PA can be omega-consistent. Such interpretations, therefore, implicitly deny that the PA-provability of [~(Ax)R(x)] can be inferred from the above meta-argument; ipso facto, they imply that (*) is false.
In the following sections, we review the Deduction Theorems used in the earlier argument, and give a meta-mathematical proof of (*). It follows that the standard interpretations of Gödel's reasoning are inconsistent with a standard Deduction Theorem of an arbitrary first order theory ([Me64], p61, Corollary 2.6). We conclude that such interpretations cannot be accepted as definitive.
An overview
We first review, in We finally prove (*) in Theorem 2.
A standard Deduction Theorem
The following is, essentially, Mendelson's proof of a standard Deduction Theorem we assume that the proposition is true for all deductions of length less than n.
is an axiom of K.
( 
This completes the induction, and Theorem 1 follows as the special case where i = n. ¶ 4 4 We use the symbol " ¶" as an end-of-proof marker.
A number-theoretic corollary
Now, Gödel has defined ([Go31a], p22, Definition 45(6)) a primitive recursive numbertheoretic relation xB (K, T) y that holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a deduction from T of the K-formula whose Gödel-number is y.
We thus have: 
An extended Deduction Theorem
We next consider the proposition: Proof: Since Gödel's number-theoretic relation xB (K, T) y is primitive recursive, it follows that, if we assume Church's Thesis -which implies that a number-theoretic relation is decidable if, and only if, it is recursive -we can effectively determine some finite natural 5 We note that Corollary 1.1 and Corollary 2.2 may be essentially different number-theoretic assertions, which may not be obviously equivalent; the "obvious" assumption (*), thus, may need a proof. 6 We note that this symbolically expresses a meta-equivalence in a recursive arithmetic RA, based on a semantic interpretation of the definition of the primitive recursive relation xB (K, T) y; it is not a K-formula. 
An additional deduction theorem
We finally prove (*) as an additional deduction theorem, in an arbitrary first order theory K: 
